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INTRODUCTION 
1.  In its Communication to the Council  (COM  (79)  188  Final)  of 7 May 
1979 concerning work  sharing,  the Commission  noted that there was  a  wide 
range of possible action with  r~gards to  ~rangement of working time. 
The  Commission felt however that variotis problems,  such as flexible 
·retirement,  justified a  Community  approach.  The  Commission furthermore 
pointed out that action in that field,  as in all those pinpointed,  should  .  . 
take account  of their impact  on  employment,  of their intrinsic merits as 
.  '  ~  -
-regards  working conditions and  of their relative costo 
~  ..  . 
As  a  follow up  to this Communication,  the Council invited the 
Cominission.to pursue its studieso  In its Resolution of 18  December  1979 
'  .concerning the  arrangement ,of  working time,  the Coimcil recalled. the 
importance  that it .attached to ·the  Commission's pursuing its work  on 
flexible retirement. 
· · The  present- document  is ·submitted in reply to this request.· 
- 2o  The  problem  of- retirement age  c~  be  approached in two  different 
ways.  In the first one,  given the present _deteriorati-on of the employment·  - .  . 
market,  the problem of retirement age is considered in terms  of worksharing 
within .the active-population.  On the contrary,the second perspective,  _  · 
based on  an analysis of the more  permanent needs- and wishes  of the elderly, 
considers  WalfB  and means  of satisfying them.  These  solutions tend to 
adjuat the systems· by the inclusion of a  double flexibility which  would 
allow,  on  t~e one  hand,  wider individual choice of retirement age and, 
on the other,- possibilities of reduced working time in the last years  of 
active .life. -2.,;. 
The  9oll¥'lission  p_ropos.es  Coinmuni ty guidelines  like~y to satisfy 
'  ' 
all the interested parties.  These  gaidelines  stem from  the solutions 
·  ~.-rhich  provide ·for such double fleXibility as mentioned ·above,  and  they 
mor-eover  take into aocount :the need to organise their implementation 
in' terms  of the economic  situation which nowadays,  is mainly characterit.:;E:d  by 
a  deterioration in the  ~mployment situation. 
3.  These  perspectives and these Community  5~idelines will b~ developed 
in de~ail i;n  the following pages but.  the .reasons which  justify a  CommimHy 
approach  nee~ perhaps to be indicated first. 
In the last· few  years·,  several Member  States have  taken the 
'  .  . . 
. initiative as regaXds  modifying,  temporarily or  definite~y, the traditior.al_. 
.process  of reti::-ement.  This pr,ocess  was  also being questioned by vario'lis 
.  I 
experts in the field of old age.  Retiremept  age has therefore become  a 
political problem for governments.· 
In the absence  of  conv~rgent.  action,. the solutions opted for',  could 
·easily vary  from~  one  State to another,  although they. may  t~nd towards 
near  similar objectives.  Furthermore the experiments  carrl.ed out are not 
. all_ of equal value:  in some  of  ~he schemes,  sometimes adopted under 
pressW.e  of the  e~onomic crisis,  there_ are,  along with  imtnediate  advantages, 
signif~cant.inconveniences ina field where  effects can be felt.only in 
the long term.  I,  . 
Consequently,  a Community  approach seems  t.o  be  juatifie9-•  . In the 
light of  ~a.tional experiences and of the work  of  experts,  the Commission 
believes that-it can contribute· to promote  convergency of future retirement 'policies by formulating guidelines which  ta.k:e  into account the aspirations 
and needs  of individuals· as well as the interests of the community  ~s 
a.  whole. 
4.  Two -appendices are attached to the present  Communication~ 
1o  Economic  and financial -aspects.' of early retirement  schemes; 
~·  Cost_of certain national  experiments  on  flexible or phased 
retirement. PROSPECTS  AND  COMMUNITY  GUIDELINES 
I •  FLEXIBLE  RETIREMENT 
'  '  -
In terms  of the  rela~ionship between the  i~dividua~ and the social 
SeC1U'ity  system,  retirement  age is the age at which  entitlement to a  pension 
'  '  ' 
is· acquir~.· In terms  of the relationship between the indiyidual and·  the 
workfng world,  ret:i,rement  age 'is the age  at which  a  person ceases vrork. 
Those  who  call for earlier retirenien\,_  emphasize  en:titTeine~t. to a 
'  '  ' 
·pension-and leave aside the question of cessation of work.·  Thus  there 
arises a  Qonflict between the claims  of·individua.ls whowish to get the 
benefit  ~fa pension as-early as 'possibie and  the financial constraints, 
w,hich  cannot.be dissociated from  demographic  and  economic  factors,  and to 
'  .  ' 
which  the schemes  in question are  subjected. 
However  nowadays  a  new  aspect  of the  ~roblem. of early retirement 
.  ' 
has  come  to light and this is due  to.the fact that the economic  crisis has 
a  marked  effect on the terms  of the p'roblem'!' 
In faet, ·e~ly retirement is more  arid  more  being presented a.s  one' 
of· those many  remedies to the decline in employment  levels and  its supporters 
~  '  '  .  ' 
include it in ~ork sharing policies.  There  ensues  an  implication that legal 
constraints or financia;I incentives will be  used to persuade the oldest 
workers  or :job  seekers to leave the aCtive population .;...and  this retirement 
from  working life is now  placed to the very  forefront~ -5-
Thus,  in various  Community  countries,  endeavours  are beiAg made  to 
encourage people to  reti~e early from all occupations,by providing them 
with "bridging pensions" or  "~arly retirement pensions"·,  which are grant  ad 
on. condition that they cease work but are high enough to provide ample 
compensation and thus _aot  as ·an  incentive  (between 70  and  90%  of  t~e salary 
depending on  the country)  •.  Suc_h  schemes  (Appendix I), have.been introduced 
in Belgium,· Denmark,  France,  Lux~mburg and  the--.Uni ted Ki~om and,  for some 
occupatio~al.seotors only,  in the Netherlands.  Similat results are obtained 
in Germany  by regulations·in the field 'of unemployment  insurance and· 
conv~t-ional agreements. (as in the steel industry)  • 
Some.  observations are however called for : 
1. First of all the hopes  of creating.job may  be thwarted in so far as 
the real significance of such departures from the labour market  on to 
retirement  has yet to ·be  proved; the  jobs vacated by older workers may  not 
necessarily suit the younger ones. 
2. Furthermore  the cost of this policy is ineyitably high  (see 
'  . 
comparative table in Appendix  I},  at a  time when  the present and future 
circumstances  of old-age  insurance  ~chemes are, often gloomy •. "Early 
retirement pensions" or "l;lridging pensions"  are,  of course,  often included 
in the framework  of unemployment-schemes,  thus  emphasizing their contingent 
characteristic and more  readily justifying the ban on working  imp~sed on 
' 
the beneficiaries - ; · but are not  such innoyations irreversible ? .. 
3. Finally and  in a  more' fundamental way,  the question arises as 
to whether all older workers wish to leave active life with the sole  prov~so 
that they receive adequate oompensationo  Obviously this is not the casew 
'  . 
Those  who  so desire,  and they are. undoubtedly in the majority, ,are  those. 
whose  only interest in their work is financial.  However  others who  have .  r• 
~or 
been hi.cicy  enough to enjoy· a  more  '!:.."'ewa.rdin€;n  professionul_ 0areer,  :i.n  t!1e 
broadest sense of the word{ lt.:eenly  resent being discarded frr.m  a.ct:i.'.fo  l"i.fe .. 
Opinion polls reveal a  wide variety of a.tt  i tudes towa:rJ.s  ret  ir.emen.t  i).l'l.d. 
their-findings are supported.by the Community  survey,-aio~g with  n~tional 
·enquiries,  on t]:le-at-'dtudes  of the active'population with regard.s't.o 
·retirement prospectD • 
. The  last. observat:i,on,  in particular,  oal}s for the. introduction. 
of so!ll.e  fl'~xibility in th.e  retirement age,  which ·could be  achievec~ by 
offering some  leeway in determining the age in question to everybodyo 
A) .The.principle 
Nowad~-s'(l), retirement age,  in .the.  s'ense  of the e,ge  at vrhich. 
pension rights are acquired· is _a  specific7  fixed age,  such as  65o  The-
.  '  . 
. very concept  of "flexibility" conflicts with thi$ rigid role  :  it 5.mplies 
that·  ,within certain l~mi  ts,  those concerned are given a. chance. to ela'ct 
at what  t_ime  they want  ·to start claiming their old-age pension.· 
This option can be regarded·in two  different lights, depending on' 
whether it relates to "median"  age,  regarded: as no:rm8.1,  with opportunities 
-for earlier or later retirement.,  '~r to a  minimum age., . 
·.  . 
A simple: example  of the first system is the basic  Swedish pe.nsion, 
! 
which may  be  gr_anted before 65  with a  reduction of  Oo5~ per month if it 
is taken earlier,  or after.65  wit~ ~  increment  of  o.6% for  each extra· 
·  · month  worked. • · 
A simple  example  of the.second·is the standard pension paid under 
\ 
the general  scheme·for.wage-and salary-earners in France,  whic~ may  be 
claimed at age  60  an~ amount.s,  in  tha~ case,  to  25%  of  earnings~  The 
.  workers  concerned inay. request  a  deferment,  in wh,ich  ca.se ~the basic  25%  is 
increased by ·1.25%  for  eaoh quarter,  or 5%  per year  :  thus,  the pension 
rises  fro~ 25%  to  3~ if it is .claime_d 'at 61,  to 5o%  at 65,. 75%  at 70, 
and  so  on. 
(1)  Under many  schemes.  .· - 7 -. 
These traditional rules-may,  in both cases,  be upset by the  introduc-
tion of early retirement_ or bridging pensions  into unemployment  schemes. 
.  .  . 
However  it must  be borne in mind  that this flexibility gives rise 
to a  series of problems  in respect of its effect on  the amount  of the 
pensions.  In fact,  the less effect the age factor has  on  the amount  of 
pension paid,  the more  attractive - and therefore the more  effective -
·flexibility becomes •..  On  the other ha.rid,  it is obvious that freedom  of 
choice is purely hypothetical if. the amount  of the pension which can be 
obtained at· a  given age  is too small,  sino e in this case,  those concerned 
are more  or less obliged to put  off claiming their'entitlement. 
! 
' 
.  ~-
Real flexibilitylmust.be such as to grant real optio?s to those 
concerned  either to cease their professional activity earlier or else 
.  I 
'~O pursue it if they so wish. A real choice  implies  of. course,  that flexibility 
cannot _be  used by an  employer to force  an  employee  to retire. 
B)  Within the framework ·of  traditional old-age  insurance schemes,·. 
various formulas  can be  envisaged 
1. ·Some  of the formulas  involve ·varying  t~e amount  paid on  the basis 
of actuarial data alone.  Thus,  the person who  claims his pension  e~lier 
is normally penalized,  as ·compared-with  someone  who  claims it later,  in 
respect  of pension coefficients and deferred retirement.  This is the case, 
for example,  in Sweden,  where  the amount  of the pension is reduced by·3Cf/o 
if claimed at 60  instead of 65.  Similarly,  in Belgium,  retiring five years 
early entails a  25%  out in pension.  Such  reductions are,  therefore,  any-
thing but negligible.  , . 
·2. If these provisions are applied to the full,  those who  are·most 
in need of retiring earlier.may well give up  the idea.  It is a  well-known 
fact that the life expectancy differs 'among  the various social groups  : 
thus,  workers performing more  arduous  or repetitive tasks have  a  relatively· -8-
low life expectancy.  The  applicatio~ of aetuarial factors  sho~d therefore. 
be adjusted by introducing advantages  designed· to offset their effects.· 
/ 
3. 'Apart from this  ind_ivid~l aspect,  it must  be, pointed out  the.t 
.a pension scheme  based on .actuarial principles and which is tneoretice.lly 
uubiaased;  nonetheless  encour8.ges people to extend· their wOrking  life_  ... 
Consequently another type of flexible  syst~m, similar to ·the German  one, 
c~  ~e envisaged;  this system alleviates the effects· of early retir_ement 
on  the· ~ount of the pension by calcula.t'ing the latte.r in terms. of th.e 
number  of years for which the person has been  insured-~he~ he claims pay-
m~t of pension,  a  r~ght which he may  exercise as  from  63  Y;ears  of age 
(.62  in certain oases) without.being p~~lized_-
""'·  To  sum  un,  compared with rigid systems  involving a  fixed retirement 
age,  some  idea of. leeway alongside a certairi flexibility can bring about-
real progress to individual needs. Fle:x:ibilityis,  also,  likely-to settle· 
.  .  -
the problem of equal treatment  for men  and women  as  regard$  reti~ement ·age  ---..  )  .  -
in those. countr~es or undel' th9se  schemes  wh~re that. age is st;i.ll at  a  diffe-
rent  level for both sexes.  In fact this solution would  enable  the·  objectiv:e  of 
equal tre.atment  to be  attained with imposing_ any rise  in the  age· of retirement· 
for women,  which would  go against the rights which. they have. acquired  a.q  well . 
as  again$t  the  freedom of choice of those  co~cerned (1). 
II. PHASED  RETIREMENT  .  , 
Fundamentally all schemes  which subscribe to the idea of "phased" 
retirem-ent'. all seek to avoid an abrupt changeover. from full-time work  t,o 
complete  idleness,  with its potential~y disastrous  consequence_· of a  su(!.den 
- '  '  \  ·. 
acceleration of ageing·as shown by-geriatric studies.  The  traditional 
.  -
definition 'of  ~'retirement 'age"  needs  thu~ be radicall:x; changed since 
(1) 
.:  •  r 
- . 
The  Col}.ference  on  ";Equality for Womenn  organised in Manchester by the. 
Commission  from  28· to 30  May  1980  also-~ecommended ~easures that would 
promote  a  flexible retirement age,  centred on  a  particular age. 
,. "phased" cessation of work  would  also entail that retirement j.s  spread 
over time. 
Phasing of retirement  involves  two  sets of problems  : 
· 1. Those  relating to the organization of the, reduced  ~orking timq. 
Should such reduction be  established as  a  right?  Or  should reliance be 
placed quite simpl-y  on  collective agreements  or on  preE!s~e for social 
charge?  If this reduction is recognised as a  right,  serious difficulties 
could ensue  in the organisation of some  undertakings.  If conventional 
agreements  are to be relied upon,  discriminatory situations.could arise 
between salari·ed employees  of strong and!  weak  sect.ors., 
· 2. Those  re~ating to compensation for the effects this reduction  . 
has  on  pay.  Here,  two  main  types  of arrangement with widely differing 
. philosophies and  implications are. conceivable  : 
' 
either everything is left to the undertaking,  which is responsible 
not  only for arranging reduced working hours but also fo.r.  the 
. corresponding (full or partial) financial. compensation; 
_,,_  or else ·.the  undertaking is responsible only for the· first of  th~se 
functions,  with the cost of financial compensation being borne ·by 
·collective schemes,  under old age pension entitlement for example. 
~) Phased retirement arrangen at· undertaking level 
·1. ·Besides the'theoretical work  done  on  the subject,  a  number  ~f 
firms  in France,  in.the UK  and in·Germany have  already launched phased 
· retirement· schemes, .:which differ  i~ the following ways  : 
- the·way in which  working·time is shortened 
··  working week,  shorter day •.s  work,  eto., and 
longer holidays,  shorter - 10 ·-
the financial  implications.  In some  cases  (e.g. the Gillette company 
in France),  there is full fl.na.ncial  compensation and· .the  employees 
suffer no  loss of wages;  in others,  however,  a.  reduction in hours 
of work carries a  oorrespondill% cut  in pay.  For instance,_ at· the 
!3ritish Leyland Motor Co.:r1>oration .(UK)  men  over 63  and women  .over 
58  may  opt for an Bo%  r~duction of their normal working time,  but 
·th~y then receive only Bo%  o~ normal  wag~s. 
'  ' 
Naturally,  sc~emes involving partial compensation are  ~lao to be 
found. 
'  '  ' 
· 2 •. It appears'· then,  that  virt~lly any' type  of·  scheme  can be 
arranged within the  ente,rprise,  since. such matters are settled in free  ' 
.negociation between the two  sides. 
Thi.s  suggests  that,  as the specific constraints facing each. 
' entel1?rise  · and each .branch of  ~ndustry can be  so.· variable and the ,wishes 
of their ·employees  no  less diverse,_ the introduction of a.  phased reduction 
.·  in working time. should be  a.  prime and typical subject for negociation 
'  -
between the two  sides of industry.  It is up  to them to introduce the age 
factor into.· systems -of allocating work  ~d  p~y. (company agreements  or,  as 
in recent oases in Gel'lllally,  in in,dustry-wide  collect~  ve agreements  1))  ~ 
The  introduction of this. factor would add·a. new  dimension to colleot:l.ve. 
bargaining. 
'-
B)  Phased retirement with less of  earnings covered by an old-age pension 
soherrie · 
·In this seoond case,· the ·shorter w~rking hours. enj?yed )Jy  older 
· workers are reflected in the wages  paid to them by their. employer,  but 
(1)  Brewing and tobacco industries. 
.  .  ' 11 -
the loss of-earnings is compensated for by an  external source,  such  as 
an  old-age pension,or other colleotively,funded scheme.  / 
The  simplest and  most  attraotive example  of such a  compensation 
arrangement  is afforded.by ·the "partial retirement"  seheme  in Sweden • 
.  / 
Under  this  s~tem, workers who  have been in wage-earning or salaried 
employment  for at least 10  years  since the age  of 45  and  who,  after 60 1  go  · 
on  a  shorter_working-week (less than 35  but more  than_l7 ·hours),  are 
entitled to a  "partial retirement  pen~ion" equal to 65%  of the loss in 
salar,y  .. resulting from  the switch from full to part-time work.  Inoome 
, ta:x:  scales a.re  so progressive in Sweden  that the actual rate of compensation 
is muoh  higher in terms  of .disposable income;  in aotual fact where  the 
·.  standard wa.ge  is concerned,such 65%  of the loss of earnings guarantees  UI> 
to 90%  of income. 
Three questions are prompted by this scheme  : 
a). its cost  :  a  contribution rate init_ially of 0.25%,  now  to be raised 
to 0.5o%,  of wages  is said to _be  sufficient to cover it; 
b)  its apPlication  =.  the workers ·concerned have  not  (or not yet) been 
officially accorded a  right to special arrangements  over  ho~s of 
worko  It would  appear,- however - and ,here we  come  back to the 
principle of· bargaining between'the two  sides of industry- that 
significant social pressure from  the unions would  be sufficient 
to win.over the employers  to such  a.sche~e; 
c)  its effects on  employment  :  prompted by social rather than economic 
considerations,· the Swedish partial retirement s.cheme  seeks by its 
,. 
gentle'transition to retirement to improve the situation of the 
elderly and not that of the labour market. 
H9wever9  improvements  of this nature which are 
being recommended  to industry could bring about  a.  certain easing· 
of the employment  situation~ liie·THE ECONOMIC  SITUATION 
The  economic  sit~ation 'can be  he~ded in two  ways  ; 
i 
· 1) in a  restrictive sense by regulatiug the cumulation of pension and. of.  -..  .  . 
professional activity as .the: economic  situation demands; 
2)  in a  broader sense by  meas~es encouraging  "e~lier" or "latern 
retirement according to. the emplojrnent ·  sit~tion., 
.A)  Regulating cumulation 
A very_  general thesis should.be taken as a ·basis for discussion : 
the higher the retirement age,  the less probable is  pe~sion likely t~ .be  .  ~  .• 
combined with income. from  work•  -The  obvious, reason for _this' -is  that,  in 
·the end,  age  inevitably brings about inability_to work:  sooner.or .later, 
'. 
but more  often later,  the ageing process merges.with invalidity. 
On  the other'hand;  the lower the retirement age,  the greater the tendency 
to  c~ulate this pension with an  ocqupatio~ :  it would qe  perfectly possible 
,. 
·to draw  a pension whilst still being·able ~d  willing to  work~  Under full 
employment  conditions, ~ooqtbining a  pension with professional occupation is 
.  . 
likely to be easily accepted but when  there is unemployment  such will not 
be the case. 
It is more  naturaf  (esp~cially in the_eontext  of·~ork-
sha.ring measures). that thed.Tawing of the pension should have  implications, 
in the form  of  rest~ict_io~s or a_ total ba.n,  f.or  the claimant's occupational 
activity - at  le~t for th.ose  wh.o  apply for retirement at an age  earlier 
than "normal". 
There  are.three main  type of implications: 
l) Concurrent  employment  restricted by'an overall limit  on  income:  this 
i~  ~h~ typ~ of ~ra,ngem~nt found· in the German  syst,em.  It has the 
double  advantage of not  excluding pensioners totally from  working life 
.  .  .  .  . 
and allowing them·to supplement  their  in~ome.  The  desire to leave room 
for ~ndividual preference remains  _uppermos~• 
· 2)  Conc~rent employment. restricted J>~ earnings being charged against_ 
the pension :,  this system is more· of a  disincentive than the previous 
one  and  thus  implies more·  oonc·ern for .wor~sharing than_ for the wishes 
.  ! 
I 
i 
.I - 13-
of pensioners; however,  leaving aside the obvious  danger of moonlighting, 
it presupposes that the levei of the pension is not too far below that 
of actual pay;·· otherwise those concerned will prefer to continue working 
if they are able to do  so. 
'  .  . 
3)  Ban  on  all gainful employment  :  this is the-most  logical although at 
the same  time the most  radical solution,  if the overriding aim  is to 
.  \ 
I  remove  the groups  offered flexible retirement from  the labour market. 
It is the method  adopted in the case of the early retirement arrangements 
introduced under unemployment  insurance schemes. However,  given the fact 
that early-retirement only lasts a  few  years,  it will only be  of a 
temporary nature. 
B)  The  various  observations regarding what  happens 'in practice lead to 
a  more  general question :  could the effect of flexibilitY on  professional 
activity be attuned to the economic  situation? 
If the· aim  were  to subordinate social secUrity .policy to  emplo~ent 
policy at too short ·a  term,  such an objective would  be very much  open-to 
argument.  '. 
However  it would be quite feasible if, whilst respecting the 
autonomous  character of  socia~ security policy,  account were  taken of the 
impact· of these ,measures·,  a.nd  in particular of the· impact  of phase  retirement  -
on  employment. 
Experience shows  that the introduction of flexible retirement would 
very probably bring about retirement from  wo~king life and  woul~ thus_~ce 
jobs,  occupied until then by 9lder workers,  available. 
Taking this different  economic  impact  into account,  temporary measures 
o.f  encouragement,. taken within the frame1-rork  of emplo:yment  policy,  could be 
envisaged in a  situation of continuing unemployment,.so as to favour (if 
necessary)  fl~ibl_e retirement "en masse"  whilst regula  tin~ cumulation. 
The'  jobs so vacated should however be· maintained as  far as possible.  On  the  othL!J" 
hand,  in a  full employment  situation,  incentives would  be  given  t~  encoura&~ 
.the continuation of work,  either on  a  full or part-time basis.  · ""14 --
In the pres  ant si  tua.tion,  various Member  States ·have  had to use. 
financial measures  to promote  early retirement.  Such·' interventions  ~ould 
be  less important  ~i  th flexible  reti~e~ent.  as the system already ihducns  in  a:  .  · 
I 
permanent  form  ,  · 
so~1e earlier age for ret:j.'remen.t.  Fur-thermore ·those interventions \'rould 
not modify the general guidelines of-retirement policy and the  benefioiari~s 
would feel neither privileged nor excluded.  Moreover  these temporary 
intervention measures  would be. more  easily reversible if the  economic 
situation were to change. 
.  \ 
with regard to the  economic  cost, ·of flexible  retirement .and the 
'  ' 
'problems -associated ~ith the  estimation, of its cost please refer to Annex. II. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  Commission·,  after consulting the representatiyes of governments 
and .social partners  on  these various  solutions,  considers itself in a 
. po~i  ti~n to propose a  Communi t,y  approach based  on  three guiding principles 
'  ' 
wh'iqh  can lead to a more  coherent  policy in that field and which  take  into 
account social as ·well as  economic  objectives whilst ·respecting their . 
necessary autonomy.  In effect, if 'the first two  proposals are prompted . 
. solely by considerations of ·social  ~rotection, having r·egard both to the 
aspirations of individuals  and to the objective needs  of older workers, 
the third proposal's aim is to bring_into ·play a  conti~gency correcting 
fa.Ctor  which wo_uld  permit  the  implementation· of th_e  first two  proposals 
in th~ light of the  economic  si~uation and particularly within the frame-
work  of  arr~gement of working time. _These  first two  proposals  are ·in no  way 
mutually exclusive!  On  the·  contrary~_from t}J.e  so·cial point of view it w:ould  be 
desirable that they both .be  introduced simultaneously or progressively. 
1.  Flexible retirement 
Retirement  age  is generally fixed by law,  'and yet  it does  not_. 
:necessarily correspond to the wishes  of  old workers - some'  might wish to 
~top working earlier wh~reas others might  wish to continue working beyond 
that age.  Moreover. that~  age  does  not cater for the fact that ageing is 
not  a  uniform' process  :  'in fact it varies according to individuals  and 
.  ..  .  .  .  .  I  .  .  .. 
a:c;cording,  ~o occupations. • FUrthermore,  \"then  that  age  is fixed at .different· 
levels for men  and women,  a  measure · o.f  unequa;I.  treatment' betlieen  ~-ex~s is 
introduced and this can be  reg~ded as  an unjustified discrimination. - 15-
These  inconveniences could be remedied by the instauration of 
flexible  retirement  :  as  from  a  certain age  (say 60)  and  up  to amaximum 
age,  the worker would  have  the right to a.  free choice of retirement age 
under such conditions that his choice is not unduly infiuenoed by.signif-
icant differences in the amounts  of pensions. 
The  means  and  ways  of  implementing this principle can be varied, 
as  is d·emoristrated by such national schemes. adopted  in favour  of certain 
social categories as-well as those which  allow all and  sundry  ~o opt for 
retirement either earlier or later than normal  retirement age.  Another 
example. is pension granted whatever the 'age  of the benefi<:?iary,  as  soon 
as· he has  accumulated a  certain number  of  insuranc_e  years.  The  point  is 
to generalise those .still limited applications of a  ·principle which  ought 
to guide  t~e future  evolution of the  questi~n of retirement  age  in legal 
as well as  in occupational  (comp~ementary) schemes. 
2. Phased retirement 
Retirement  is generally  acco~p<:mied by a  brutal cessat'ion of 
·professional activity and  experts are all agreed that this absence  of 
transition between fulli.time activity and total inaotivityis extremely 
ha.rritful  to the health of older workers. 
This  harmful break can·be avoided by phased retirement  :  as from 
a  certain_age,  as  mentioned  above,  the worker who  does not  immediately 
retire would be offered a  reduction of his professional activity.  Loss 
of earnings would  be financially compensated for one  way  or the other but _ 
. the right. to social security would be maintained in full.  The  worker who 
does  not  avail himself of this opportunity would,on the other hand,  keep 
the right to. work part time when"he  retires~•)rn both cases,  the brutal 
cessation ·is avoidedo 
It must  be poiuted out that part time work  can be  imagined under 
various modes  :  in.relation to a  full day (half time),  to a_week  (two  or 
.three days  a  w~ek) or to a year (longer holidays for  ~ple). 
I 
(•) with a  possible negative effect  on  unemployment. 16  -
3. Correcting mechanism 
Flexible retirement has  a  more  direct  impact  on  employment  than 
phased retirement,  at least in the  ~t-term. · 
.  ' 
In view of this different economic  impact,  employment  policy measures 
'  could be taken during a  limited period ·of  time·when  unemployment  persists, 
-SO  that flexible retirement 
11en  masse" - the Vacancies  SO  created being 
·maintained- is promoted by financial  incitements;._  On  the otherhand,  when 
ther~ is full employment, ·on the  contra.:tty  stress would be  placed more  on 
the continuation of work  • 
.  ' 
X 
X  X 
- These  three general guidelines having.been_defined,-there still 
·remain~ the difficulty-of formulating  standar~ rules .which reconcile the 
social -considerations and  economic  constraints mentioned above.  In other 
words  it will be possible to implement  any of the guidelines adopted· in 
different _ways  ·once  the  obje~tive has been defined at Community. level. 
- ' 
More  precise recommendations  could, .in no  way,  take  into account· the 
variety_ of-demographic,  econ?mio,  fi~cia~,_  s~ciol?gic~l,. psychological, 
.historical and  judicial factors  involveq.  and  they would  consequently be 
· out  of place.  Each  country mnst  therefore look for  op~imum choices· in 
the light ·of all these factors •. 
The  l~gis~ation or. the  oollecti  ve ·-agreements_ (  ~i  thin induStries 
or sectors),  as the case may  be;  should eventually gradually implement 
flexible schemes  which  have  received general approval. APPENDIX  1 
BELGIUM 
ECONOMIC  AND  FINANCIAL  ASPECTS 
OF  EARLY  RETIREMENT  SCHEMES 
·A  temporary bridgirig pension scheme  under collective agreeme.nt  was 
introduced,  limited at first in 1975  to·  dismisse~- elderly workers but 
extended by law from  1976  to elderly workers  who  agreed to retire to make. 
place for the recruitm,ent  of young workers.  Under this scheme  worker~ 
aged-60  (55 in the case of women)  were guaranteed an  income  equal-to the 
unemployment  benefit plus half.the difference between the latter and their 
net  earnings  s11:bject  to a  ceilingo  The  scheme.  was  later extende_d  to 
rectify the situation of unemployed workers  and disabled persons aged 60. 
The  bridging pension ceases when  the person concerned reaches the age at 
which  he  is entitled to the statutory pension. 
An  estimated 63  000  persons 'have benefited under this scheme .(?/3 
of whom·under  the legal scheme)  and  90%  of the posts thus released have  been 
filled by the recruitment  of new  staff. 
,, 
The  costs of the statutory bridging pension scheme  were  es.timated at 
Bfr 5,800 million for complement  of 16,000 beneficiaries for a  whole  year and 
12;000 beneficiaries  for·pa~t of the year (that is to  SS\Y  a.n  average  complement 
of·22,000 beneficiaries). 
DENMARK 
,, 
In Denmark,  provision was  made  in .1977  for ·early retirement ·at  55 
years  (the usual age is no  less'than 67)  for persons  encountering employment 
or social difficultieso  ·This was  foll()wed in 1979 by. t'he  introduction of 
an early retirement scheme  fo~ workers  aged 60 or more  who  voluntarily 
gave  up  their jobs.  The  ~llowance represent  90%  of average  earnings  over 
2 ·1/2 years,  dropping to  8r:J/o  for the next  2  years,  then to 6ri%  until· 
pensionable age.  The  system has met  with unexpected successo 
In its' first-six months  of· operation,  30  000  persons  took advantage 
of .the  scheme,  that is one-third of the total number  of potential b'enef:... 
iciaries; for the "{ear  as  a  whole,  the figure should reach 40  000.  The 
. replacement rate is estimated at  lOci%. APPENDIX  I· 
The,cost of this system when  in full  opera~ion is eXpected to be-
DKR  2  600  million. 
FRI\.NCE 
In 1972,  under national collective· agreement  unemployment  benefit 
for. wage  earners  dismi~sed afte-r the age  of 60  was  raised to 70%'  of the" 
last three months'  salary.  Under  an  agreement  in 1g77.,  the. system. was.-
~tended to cover  resign~tion where  the beneficiary ceases  ~coupational 
. .  ' 
activity.  The·  statu~ory reform  of the unemployment  insurance system 
maintains this provision in-force in the f()rm' of an  ~noome support 
("Ailooation de  garan:tie 'de· ressources") although resignation is only 
covered until March  198~~  This measure  applies  un~il th~ person concerned 
re~ohes.65. 
In 1978,  120  000  persons took advantage  of the scheme  introduced 
... 
by the agreements  on  early retirement in oases of redundancy or voluntary 
r~signat-ion (the  fi~e is ·estimated .at 160  000  for 1979),  which  represen~s 
nearly 3o%  of the total number  of potential beneficiaries•  -The_rat~ of 
replacement- is believed  --to  be low.- . 
.. 
In 1978  the cost of the system amounted  to FF 4  600  m.illion. 
LUXEMBOtmG 
·; 
I 
' 
\ 
In view  of the "steel_ crisis;  in,lg-{7  the Government.decided to adopt 
a  compulsory early retirement  system for elderly workers,  applying-it. first 
to this sector.  These  workers  receive degressive tide-over allowances 
(from. 85%  to 70%  of earnings) for the ~hree years pr,evious  to the age  at 
which  they quali.f;r for the  ~arly .retirement pension  ( 62. ·years  for- manual  ' 
. workers: 60  years for  metal..:.~o;rkers . and  salary earners).  On  the other 
hand,  they may  not pursue any other activity.  The  system, -designed to 
cover· the 3 years  1978-i98o,  has been  ~tended up  to  1982~ · 
This  system· therefore affects all 'steel work?rs;  the replacement rate 
is zero since the aim  is to reduce  the workforce.  The  total cost  of:  the 
system for 1  070 beneficiaries has been·estiinated at LFr-1  200  mili:lono 
NETHERLANDS 
In 1976; workers  aged 60  became  entitled to receive benefits for an 
. unlimited.period,  or more  precisely until retirement age  (65  years).,  Various --3- APPENDIX  I 
~experiments have been carried  out  on  a  temporary basis,  e.~. offering an 
early retirement pension_oorresponding to  Bo%  of earnings from  t~e age  of 
63  to elderly workers  who  agree to retire :  these schemes  have  been 
implemented  in Education,  Construction and Metalworking,  Ports'  Services 
and  more  recentlJ': in the Civil Serviceo At  present early retirement would  be 
introduced in 99  pranches  of employment  out of 177.  • 
In the sect?rs  co~cer.ned (excluding the Civil Service,  where  the 
results· are. not  y~t available)  about  25%  of all ·potential beneficiaries 
have taken advantage  of the system. 
A study on  a  h~othetical voluntary early retirement  scheme- (entitle-
ment  to  8CY{o  of ear.nin_gs)  assumes  that such a  systeq~ could interest 50%  of 
the potential benefic_iarieis,  and  that .  the  replacem.ent  rate for the  jobs thus 
vacated would  also be  5o%.  Financed-by employers,  this scheme  would  release 
55  000  jobs· in 1983  and  75 ·ooo  in 1985; ·the. figures  would· be slightly low·er 
if the  sche~e were financed by wage  and  salar•y earners.  The  system could -be 
, 
financed by contributions from-salaries,  paid-either by the  employees  (o,2%) 
or by the  employers  (0,4%)o 
UNITED  KINGDOM,  .• 
Under  a  law enacted in lCJ77,  "Job release scheme",  a.  temporary allowance 
of £23  per week was  m~e payable at .age  64  (59 in the case  of women)  to workers -
leaving· a  p·ost  which  could be filled by an  unemp~oyed worker.  In lfJ79  the 
age was  subsequently iowered to  6~ for men  (60 for the disabled),  but it 
was  reset at 64  in 1980 for healthy males. 
It is estimated that this scheme  has .absorbed 105  000  unemployed,  the 
replacement rate being 96%. 
A study has  show~ :that if th~ retirement age were  generally lowered 
to 60  years,  assuming' a  two-thirds  rep],acemen~  r~te,  unemployment  wouJ:d  drop 
by 200  000  in the first year and ·6oo  000  ~n the long'termo  The  gros~ cost 
of such a  reduction would  be about £900  mill~on per year at the outset, 
rising to £1  800  million in the final phase.  The  cost  (taking account  of. 
the effects on  employment)  would  be only £1  000  million per year; however, 
the lon€-term effects  of  such a  system  on  inflation,  international competitivity 
and new-unemployment  ~e uncertain. - 4- APPENDIX  I 
I 
THE  AVERAGE  ANNUAL  COST,  PER  BENEFIC~ARY, 
OF  ··EARLY  RETIRE~ENT SCHEMES 
-In  National  turrency 
,'  .. 
TOTAL  ANNUAL  COST 
~  NUMBER  OF  C_OST  PER 
COUNTRY  PER  YEAR  BENEFICIARIES  BENEFICIARY. 
- . 
-- .. 
"  -
-- " 
BELGIUM  (1978)  5,800 million  ~FR  22;000  264,000  BFR  .-
'•  .  - <•>  ,1/ 
.  .  -
•  ' 
DENMARK  (1980)  2~600 m-ill ion  DKR  40,000  65;000  DKR 
'  -- . - ·-
. 
I 
FRAt"4CE  (1978)  4,600  million  FF  -120,000  38;300· FF 
' 
. 
LUXEMBOURG  :  400 'million  LFR  1,079  373,000  LFR 
-
-
·•  -
l!lETHERLANDS  Exper_ience  cannot  be  used  for  international  comparison  " 
•,' 
..  '  ·as  it  as  it stems  only  from  very  few  sectors. 
'•  .. 
'  \  ·- .. 
. .  . . 
'  .. 
. .  . . 
UNITED  KINGDOM  ,,  23  UKL  1,200  UKL 
(1978)  '  ,.  -.  per  week  '  - •. 
·- - ·. 
(*)  Only  the  statutory early- ret.i reme.nt  scheme·. APPENDIX  !I 
A.  GERMANY 
COST  OF  CERTAIN  NATIONAL  EXPERJJJIENTS 
ON  FLEXIBLE  OR  PHASED  RETIREMENT 
Workers  may  opt to retire between 63  and  67  yearf3  of age,  if they · 
have been insured for  35  years. 
ls Number  of persons retiring between the ages  of 63  and 65  (1) 
11]73  85  000 
1974  :  170  000 
1975  .  165  000  . 
11]76  165  000 
11]77  :  150  000 
It is estimated that,  of those eligible for a  pension at age 63,  the 
following actually claimed it 
lq'J q  60% of 1nsured persons born in  190~ 
70·% of insured persons born in 1910 
77  % of insured persons born in 1911 
81·%  of insured persons born in 1912 
The  percentage  of pension claims from  persona  aged  betwee~ 65  and  67 
is negligible.· 
(1)  "Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt--und Berufaforschung"· 
(L~bour Market  and  Vocational Research) 
1979  no.  1  page  31. ' APPENDIX~ II 
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2. Cost  of·the measure  in 1976_  Monthly cost 
a)  165  000  (beneficiaries) x  DM  1100 
. (average monthly amount  of pensions 
taken· at age  63) 
b)  The  amount  saved on  unemployment 
benefits as  a  result of persons 
pen_sioned ·o-ff  a:t  age  63  bein~ 
·replaced by other workers  should · 
· be deducted from  this sum.  It is 
estimated  (1) that the 165  000 
persoris  who-benefited  in-1976 
freed  jobs. for 99  000  work_ers 
(6&%  repl-acement  rate) •.. 
Hence  a  th~oretical saving of 
99  000  x  DM  800  (average monthly · 
-amount  of unemployment  benefit)·_ 
c)  Real  expenditure may,  therefore, 
be assesse!l at a  in~imum·of : 
d)  An  apparent  oost  of  DM  1 100 · 
(average amoUnt  of pension) 
.per beneficiary per month  thus 
becomes  a  real maximum  cost  of  : 
102  300  000  . 
165  ooo·  =  DM  620.  (2) 
DM  181 ·500  000 
.-
DM  - 79  200  000 
DM  102  300  000 
(1)  Source  :  as above. 
. (2) 
.  . 
Similarly,  it may  -be  ca1culat~d that a  ·.25%  replaCement ·rate· (  inst~ad 
of 6o%)  would  result. -in  a  real cost  of  DM  900  per 'person per  month~ 
Conversely,  a  75%  replacement  rate would  result  in a  real cost  of 
llr1  500  per .month.  · ~ A more  detailed calculation should take into account  : 
1) the loss of taxes and social insurance contribu-
tions based on  salaries fpr the final two  years 
not worked before the age  of 65  years  (a loss 
which is partiaily compensated for by deductions  .  . 
made  from  pensions); 
2)  the ·gains  on  taxes  and  social insurance contribu-
tions from  the salaries of new  workers  who  occupy .. 
the  jobs thus vacated. 
B.  SWEDEN 
Wage- and  salary-earners who  wish to work shorter hours  between the 
ages  of 60  and  65-ob~ain a  partial pension equivalent to 65%  of_the loss 
of · earningS. 
1. Number·of beneficiaries 
in 1978  :  44  000 
out of a  wage- and  salary•earning working population of 200  000  persons 
aged 60  to 65. 
It is estimated  tha~ when  the  scheme  becomes_ fully operative :th_is  figure 
would rise to 50  obo,  or a  quarter of the work-force in the category 
· affected. 
2. Cost  of the measure  in 1978 
a)  Total annual  expenditure  : 
'(a about 150 million dollars) 
Revenue  from national contributions 
(0.25% of earnings)  . 
687  000  000  Ski-
403-000  QOO  Ski:. - 4-
Tho  contribution will be  raised to O.,So%  of  earnings 
>vhich  will  en<:1blo  cxpendi turc to bo  bo.loncedo 
b)  Cost  of  tho measure  por beneficiary 
per month  : 
X 
X  X 
681  000  000 
44  000  X  12 
APPEN~DIX II 
Slcr  1  300 